Senior Editor and Reporter
Jesse Eisinger is a senior editor and reporter at ProPublica. He is the author of the “The Chickenshit Club: Why the Justice Department Fails to Prosecute Executives.”
In April 2011, he and a colleague won the Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting for a series of stories on questionable Wall Street practices that helped make the financial crisis the worst since the Great Depression. He won the 2015 Gerald Loeb Award for commentary. He has also twice been a finalist for the Goldsmith Prize for Investigative Reporting.
He serves on the advisory board of the University of California, Berkeley’s Financial Fraud Institute. And he was a consultant on season three of the HBO series “Succession.”
He was a regular columnist for The New York Times’s Dealbook section. His work has appeared in The New York Times, The Atlantic, NewYorker.com, The Washington Post, The Baffler, The American Prospect and on NPR and “This American Life.” Before joining ProPublica, he was the Wall Street Editor of Conde Nast Portfolio and a columnist for the Wall Street Journal, covering markets and finance.
He lives in Brooklyn with his wife, the journalist Sarah Ellison, and their daughters.
The Sarbanes Oxley law, also known as SOX, cleaned up corporate accounting. It provides hope for how the new financial regulatory law, Dodd-Frank, could work.
Sen. Robert Casey, D-Pa., today sent a series of questions to Freddie’s regulator, highlighting how much remains unknown about the mortgage giant’s controversial bets against American homeowners.
In aletter to Senator Robert Casey, the Federal Housing Finance Agency said ithalted mortgage giant Freddie Mac’s controversial trades because they required specializedrisk management.
After an examination by its regulator, Freddie agreed not to make new investments that profited from homeowners staying trapped in high interest-rate mortgages. But Freddie has kept billions worth of those investments.
The taxpayer-owned mortgage giant made investments that profited if borrowers stayed stuck in high-interest loans while making it harder for them to get out of those loans.
Under Romney, Bain Capital used debt liberally to generate high returns. Now, when the U.S. can borrow at low rates, his own leveraged buyout logic should dictate that the government borrow more -- not less.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has been scared to bring big banks to trial for wrongdoing that helped cause the financial crisis. But that strategy fails to hold the big banks accountable and weakens the SEC's negotiating position.
A secret confederacy of Occupy Wall Street sympathizers is criticizing the financial industry for becoming a machine to enrich itself, fleecing customers and exacerbating inequality.
Bloomberg story shows that while we still haven’t had a full accounting of the financial crisis, we did have a Treasury Secretary sharing what amounts to inside information with a few elite Wall Street traders. Here are some questions that demand answers.
The financial reform law’s fixes for the derivatives market may work. But they may not. Nobody really knows.
After the CDO conflagration, the SEC has wrung measly settlements from banks and charged only two bankers, both low-level, while letting their bosses scamper away. That needs to change.
A $285 million SEC settlement appears to wipe the slate clean on Citi's multi-billion-dollar CDO business.
Morgan Stanley seems solid, but so did Dexia.
As a draft of the Volcker rule has made the rounds in the last several weeks, it has alternatively caused fits of despair and cries of exultation. And that’s just among the proponents of the regulation.
Since emerging as one of the country’s largest banks, Wells Fargo has continued to let its numbers speak for themselves. That may not be such a good thing.
Warren Buffett’s $5 billion investment in B of A is hardly a confidence booster.
What was made can be unmade.
The federal government, in ways explicit and implicit, profoundly subsidizes and shelters the banking industry, and the protection is so well established that we barely notice it anymore.
Many other banks created deals with similar characteristics to the transaction that resulted in JPMorgan's $154 million settlement with the government. But the SEC still faces big challenges in wresting more settlements from banks.
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