Last year we wrote about how Democrats used front groups,
disingenuous testimony, and other aggressive tactics to manipulate
California’s independent redistricting commission. The effort was meant to
create safe seats for the Democratic Party and in particular for incumbents.
“Every member of the Northern California
Democratic Caucus has a ticket back to DC,” said one enthusiastic memo written
as the process was winding down.
So how did congressional Democrats do in California after
redistricting shook everything up? Quite well.
Of 34 Democratic incumbents, only three lost their races, all
three to other Democrats. Overall, Democrats in California gained four seats. (One
race is close and may result in a recount.)
There are, of course, many variables at work in any election
(enthusiasm for the party’s presidential candidate, turnout, gaffes, hair
shininess). And in some cases, the new districts did result in harder campaigning
and higher spending. But the Democrats’ performance in California appears
to be a powerful illustration of how redistricting can help incumbents.
Consider the case of Jerry McNerney,
who just won a healthy victory in the 9th Congressional district, a northern
California seat just south of Sacramento.
Nobody thought it would be that way. McNerney,
running in conservative country, beat his Republican opponent in 2010 by just 3,000
votes. The Washington Post deemed
him an almost certain victim of redistricting. It would be hard to draw a
winnable district for him in the area, and it would be hard for anyone to
justify the continuation of his octopus-shaped gerrymander before the citizen
commission.
Yet, as our earlier reporting showed, McNerney
was part of a coordinated effort by the California Democratic Congressional
Delegation to lock in a redrawing of Northern California districts that all-but-guaranteed
a safe seat for every incumbent who wanted one.
A purportedly Republican-friendly shell group encouraged
Republicans in the region to push the commission for a district that was
actually against their party’s best interests. The group was connected to Paul
Mitchell, a Democratic political consultant, and helped McNerney
get a liberal pocket – in Contra Costa County – into the district. (Both
McNerney and Mitchell did not respond to requests for
comment.)
It worked. The commission drew the desired map, McNerney relocated to his custom-drawn new district, and
the election results tell the rest: McNerney won his new
district by eight percentage points, and won the liberal Contra Costa pocket by
18 points. In the rest of the district, he squeezed by with just a few thousand
votes.
Much of the attention on the elections in California had
been focused on another race, between two titans in the state’s Democratic delegation,
Reps. Howard Berman and Brad Sherman. The fact that
they were competing in the same district was
portrayed as a sign that in the topsy-turvy world of redistricting,
incumbents could not guarantee re-election via custom-tailored district.
Media outlets proclaimed a battle royale between the two savvy
politicians. But while the race did yield its moments (like a video of the two
candidates in a near-scuffle
on stage), it may never have been that close, in part thanks to redistricting.
Campaign finance records from April, May and July 2011
– all months the redistricting commission was active — show that Sherman
employed the same Democratic consultant, Paul Mitchell, who helped engineer McNerney’s redistricting success. With an assist from
redistricting maps submitted to the commission by another Mitchell client, the final
district encompassed 60 percent of Sherman’s old district and only 16 percent
of Berman’s.
In a statement to ProPublica last year, Berman said: “I just
chose not to do what many on both sides of the aisle did: try to sway the
commission to do something that was good for one member,”
While many have assumed that redistricting forced the
congressmen to run against each other, Sherman appears to have had another
option. There was another nearby district that many within the party thought
would be perfect for Sherman. Indeed there were calls within the party for him to move there.
That would have allowed both Berman and Sherman a good chance at reelection. It
also could have kept a competitive seat from going Republican simply for lack
of a quality Democratic candidate.
But why would Sherman move when he could have a district even
more suited to him?
In the end it was not even close. Sherman won with 60.5
percent of the vote compared to Berman’s 39.5 percent.
Sherman’s campaign did not respond to requests for comment
for this article.
